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Abstract 
The interest of this paper is to show the impact of governance on foreign direct investment 
and its different effects among Maghreb Arab countries and Asian countries. The results of 
the effect of political stability, the rule of law, the quality of regulation and the way 
responsibility and Showed That governance Positively and Significantly contributed to 
Improving the attractiveness of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia purpose in the Arab 
Maghreb countries, and the way responsibility: has a significant negative impact on FDI. The 
objective of this work is to study the impact of governance on direct foreign investment (FDI) 
for a panel of Maghreb Arab countries in Asia countries during 1996 to 2014. Empirical 
verification generally shows significant results in Asia and is not significant in countries of Arab 
Maghreb. Indeed, thesis results in Asian countries claim that governance plays a key role in 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Keywords: governance, foreign direct investment, Arab Maghreb, Asia, panel data. 
        1. Introduction  
Garretsen and Peeters (2007) find that FDI inflows result in the corporate tax rate. However, 
foreign investors are not only looking the lowest tax rates, they also require better 
institutional quality, and governments compete to attract FDI that may be required to provide 
an effective way within the institutional framework. FDI can have a positive impact on the 
quality of governance. This aspect of FDI effects has not received a lot of literature. The FDI is 
the source of the most important external financing in developing countries. Institutions are 
needed to attract foreign investors. In particular, good governance stimulates foreign direct 
investment and a better allocation of economic resources. For example several empirical 
studies as Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) from panel data helped highlight the role 
of institutions for growth and economic development. Indicators of good governance such as 
political stability, democracy, freedom from corruption is other factors such as the 
administrative organization, the effective political, civil liberties are fundamental to promote 
economic development in all countries of the world. Because today the accumulation of 
capital and market size are not guarantees of rapid economic growth and sustainable 
development is the reduction of poverty. Good governance is a New Institutional Economics 
(NIE), which plays a very important role in strengthening economic development in African, 
Latin American and Asian countries. 
The importance of socio-political factors to attract long-term foreign investors is emphasized 
in the literature. Thus, the inclusion of various measures of social and political attributes of 
the host country in the factors behind the FDI inflows is not an aspect of the recent literature 
of FDI. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in this subject, with work 
focused on these representative factors of institutional quality. Three factors contributed to 
the emergence of this interest. First, from the North (1990) there has been growing awareness 
of the important role of governance in shaping the incentives for investment and economic 
activity in general. Second, there was a rapid growth of FDI flows in the 1990s, and the growing 
interest of countries in transition and developing countries has attracted most of these flows. 
Third, foreign investors have shown greater interest in the quality of governance. The 
association of the nations of South East Asia (ASEAN) is widely regarded as the region with the 
most successful in the developing world to attract foreign capital flows (at least until the 
financial crisis Asian economic and 1997), particularly foreign direct investment, and in 
achieving poverty reduction. On the importance of economic integration and the role that can 
play in attracting foreign investors. In this respect, regional integration agreements will seek 
to attract foreign capital. So does the Arab Maghreb country is able to achieve regional 
economic integration to attract foreign investors. In recent decades, there have been a 
number of regional agreements. Many countries have begun to explore and participate in 
economic integration. 
 
 
The impact of governance on foreign direct investment through a study of the countries of 
Maghreb Arab countries and Asian countries over the period 1996-2014. We examine the 
following research questions: 
(1) Does governance have more impact on foreign direct investment in Maghreb Arab  in Asian 
countries ? 
This article is organized as follows: we present a literature review on the link between 
governance and foreign direct investment (FDI). Then we will present the methodology and 
describe the variables, the sample and the specification of the model. We examine the 
empirical results on the link between governance and foreign direct investment (FDI). Finally, 
we will present our findings and policy implications. 
          2. Literature review 
Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) examined the impact of institutional variables on 
bilateral foreign direct investment and conclude that the institutional distance tends to reduce 
the bilateral FDI that is to say between the countries 'origin. We assess whether the similarity 
between institutions of the host country and the country of origin raises the bilateral FDI. 
Institutional proximity between the country of origin and the host country is also important, 
but we found little impact of institutions in the country. The results are encouraging in the 
sense that efforts to improve the quality of institutions. Some studies have pointed to how 
the country of origin, address institutional variables and their impact on FDI. One of the first 
variable to consider in this regard was the importance of political factors as crucial 
determinants of FDI (Root and Ahmed (1979)). 
Huang (2003) notes that poor institutions are reducing the supply of local entrepreneurship 
but high quality institutions increase local entrepreneurs so mind FDI is partly determined by 
the strength or weakness of entrepreneurship local in host countries. By this reasoning, in a 
country with poor entrepreneurship, the business climate may succeed in attracting more FDI. 
Recent studies have pointed to composite measures of institutional quality and their impact 
on foreign direct investment. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) emphasize the link between 
governance and FDI flows and found that good governance yields are more important for the 
development of economies in transition compared to others. The study Boujedra (2005) 
showed that the risk has a significant impact on FDI, in a sample of countries from Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Gani (2007) notes that the rule of law, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness and political stability are positively correlated 
with FDI. Indeed, the literature on institutions and FDI has delineated several ways by which 
institutions matter for FDI inflows. For example, Stein and Daude (2007) provide two channels 
with poor quality institutions may discourage FDI inflows. The authors assert that weak 
institutions can act as a tax and therefore a cost to the FDI. Poor institutional quality can also 
increase uncertainty with all types of investment, including FDI. We postulate that the poor 
quality of institutions may increase the volatility of FDI inflows and can have a negative impact 
on economic growth. The impact of institutions on the volatility of FDI flows is a relatively 
unexplored relationship in the literature. Recent studies of the relationship between FDI and 
corruption found that corruption reduces FDI inflows (Egger and Winner (2006)). However, 
there is little research to find out if corrupt countries derive less benefit from FDI they receive. 
According UNCTAD (2002) investment incentives for investment aid (linked to corruption and 
administrative inefficiency), collective facilities and after-investment. This leaves appear 
clearly the positive relationship between good governance and foreign direct investment 
(Asiedu (2003); Chatterje and Mathur (2003)). According Ndinga (2002) poor governance 
helps reduce inward FDI because of distortions and uncertainty it creates. Root and Ahmed 
(1979) Schneider and Frey showed the negative impact of economic instability, political, social 
and legal on FDI. Asiedu (2003) discusses the positive impact of macroeconomic stability, 
efficient institutions, political stability and a good regulatory framework on FDI. Mauro (1995) 
showed a negative correlation between corruption and the rate of investment and between 
corruption and growth rates for 67 countries during 1960-1985. Chan and Gemayel (2004) for 
their part, have shown in their study that the risk and the political instability of a country are 
the primary determinants of the weakness of FDI. It is for this reason that developments in 
the countries governments to encourage foreign investors are obliged to put in place sound 
macroeconomic policies and especially improve their governance system. The main objective 
of our study is to examine the impact of governance through its various indicators (rule of law, 
corruption, political stability, government effectiveness ...) on foreign direct investment. 
Table 1: Examples of countries that have experienced significant institutional change from 
1998-2008 
The governance indicators Countries have significantly 
improved 
Countries have seen a 
significant deterioration 
Effectiveness of government Israel, China, Tajikistan 
Indonesia, Colombia, 
Malaysia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Algeria, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Georgia 
Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Serbia 
Afghanistan, Rwanda 
Maldives, Zimbabwe, Ivory 
Coast, Chad, Mauritania, Fiji, 
Belize, Togo, Spain, Bolivia, 
Belarus, Italy, Lebanon. 
regulatory quality Slovakia, Angola, 
Tajikistan, Belarus, Republic 
of Congo, Libya, Georgia, 
Iraq 
Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Bolivia, 
Venezuela, Argentina, 
Maldives, Ecuador, Ivory 
Coast, Gabon, Uruguay. 
Rule of law Latvia, Estonia, Albania, 
Serbia, Liberia, 
Georgia, Rwanda 
 
Zimbabwe, Eritrea, 
Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
Ecuador, Kyrgyzstan, 
Thailand. 
corruption control Estonia, Indonesia, Tanzania, 
Albania, Georgia, 
Hong Kong, Rwanda, 
Serbia, Liberia 
Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Ivory 
Coast, Greece. 
                                             Source : Kaufman et al (2008) 
 
4. Methodology and Data 
In this paper, we will try to study and empirically evaluate the relationship between 
governance and foreign direct investment in countries Maghreb Arab and Asian countries over 
a period from 1996 to 2014, using data panel and the World bank database. 
4.1. Econometric model 
We use panel data to study the impact of governance on FDI. The context of the Arab Maghreb 
countries and Asian countries during the period 1996-2014. We develop their model using 
indicators of governance. We also use a number of new control variables in our model. Other 
variables can be added to the model to assess their relative impact. In this section, we 
estimate a model that connects the IDE with governance in the presence of financial 
development variables, civil freedom and other variables. This part deals with our first 
question: (1) Is the governance of the overall attractiveness of foreign investors in countries 
and Arab Maghreb countries in Asia? 
Our empirical model is developed to study the impact of governance on FDI in countries Arab 
Maghreb and Asia. The model takes the following form: 
model 1 
= β0 + β1STABit + β2CLit+β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit+β5INFit + β6HKit + β7CREDit + β8ODAit + 
β9Debt it+   
Model  2 
= β0 + β1CORit + β2CLit + β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit + β5INFit + β6Hkit + β7CREDit+ β8ODAit + 
β9Debtit  +   
Model 3 
= β0 + β1EFFECTit + β2CLit + β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit + β5INFit+ β6Hkit + β7CREDit + 
β8ODAit+β9Debtit +  
Model 4 
= β0 + β1Rule of Lawit + β2CLit + β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit + β5INFit + β6Hkit + β7CREDit 
+β8ODAit+β9Debtit +   
Model 5 
= β0 + β1REGit + β2CLit + β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit + β5INFit + β6Hkit + β7CREDit + β8ODA it+ 
β9Debtit +   
Model 6 
= β0 + β1RESPit + β2CLit +β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit+β5INFit + β6Hkit + β7CREDit + β8ODAit + 
β9Debtit +   
Model overall  7 
= β0 + β1GOVit + β2CLit + β3GDPit+ β4Opennessit+β5INFit + β6HKit + β7CREDit + β8ODAit + 
β9Debtit +    
4.2. The sample 
Countries Arab Maghreb: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania 
Nations Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
 
4.3. Variables 
The dependent variable (endogenous variables) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI): are measured by net FDI as% of GDP. 
The explanatory variables (exogenous variables) 
Governance (GOV): is based on an index developed by Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 
(1999) the index is an aggregate of six buildings: rule of law, corruption, voice and 
accountability, efficiency government, political stability, regulatory quality. Corruption and 
political instability are governance indicators that seem to have the greatest impact on foreign 
direct investment (FDI). 
Political stability (STAB): political stability and absence of violence (Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence; STAB) measures the perceived likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism. As well as the political stability of the government, which is 
a political institutional function based on the correlation between FDI, the different national 
institutional factors and bilateral investment treaties. Political stability is seen as the most 
important aspect of governance in terms of relationship with the IDE. 
Corruption (COR): control of corruption (Control of Corruption; CRP) measures the perception 
of corruption in which public power is exercised for private gain, including both large and small 
forms of corruption, as well as " the accaparation "of the state by elites and private interests. 
Corruption is a threat to FDI because it allows people to take positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability. The patronage threatens the rights of foreign investors because 
it facilitates the expropriation by the government investment or can cause direct conflicts with 
clients and investors 
Government effectiveness (EFFECT): government effectiveness (Government Effectiveness; 
GEFCV) measures the perceived quality of public services, the quality of public education and 
the degree of its independent from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
their implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Rule of law: rule of law (Rule of Law; RLAW) measures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence and respect the rules of society in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property fingers, police and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
Regulations (REG): the quality of regulation (Regulatory Quality; REQTY) measures the 
perception of the government's ability to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that promote the development of the private sector. 
Voice and accountability (RESP: representation and participation (Voice and Accountability; 
ACNT) measures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression , freedom of association and 
freedom of the press. 
Control variables 
To improve our empirical analysis, we also consider a set of control variables. These variables 
are the following: 
Gross domestic product per capita (GDP) measures the rate of economic growth per capita, 
level of life is defined by GDP per capita. 
Trade openness (OPEN) is measured by the total of exports and imports to GDP. An open 
economy is conducive to FDI flows. We expect a positive coefficient. 
Inflation (INF): it is measured by the percentage change in the GDP deflator is the variable 
that represents the macro economic policy. Is proxy for macroeconomic stability in the 
economy. It is measured by the rate of inflation on the basis of either the index of consumer 
prices or the GDP deflator. A higher inflation rate is lower indicator of macroeconomic stability 
and real incomes. It therefore discourages market research but not necessary for the research 
resources. We expect a negative coefficient. 
Human capital (HK): it is measured by the percentage of secondary education and obtained 
from the World Bank database. 
The financial market development (CRED) is assessed respectively, total credit by financial 
intermediaries in the private service in relation to GDP (it measures a country's financial 
intermediation and market capitalization relative to GDP). 
Development assistance (HELP): percentage of GDP represents disbursements of loans and 
grants concessional terms (excluding repayment of principal) and grants by public bodies of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
External debt (DEBT): it is measured by total debt to GDP 
Table 2: The independent variables and expected signs 
FDI / GDP Foreign direct investment. 
exogenous variables  expected sign 
political stability (STAB) Positive 
Corruption (COR) Negative 
Government Effectiveness Positive 
Rule of Law Positive 
regulatory quality Positive 
The track and responsibility Positive 
GDP per capita Positive 
Inflation (INF) Positive/ Negative 
Trade openness (OPEN) Positive 
human capital (KH) Positive 
Financial Development (CRED) Positive 
Development assistance (HELP) Positive 
External debt (DEBT) Positive 
                                                    Source: specification of the author. 
 
4.4. The estimation technique 
The method of principal component analysis (PCA) for indicators of governance. 
The base Kaufman et al (2008) studies the quality of governance based on the processes by 
which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; the government's ability to 
effectively manage resources and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
the state for governance that govern economic and social interactions. It includes six 
indicators that describe different dimensions of governance. Our fertility rate will be a 
weighted average of six major components of governance variables, the weight will be 
determined by the proportion of variance explained by each variable principal component. 
Scully (1992) has already used this method to build are index of political and economic 
freedom; Alesina and Perotti (1996) were used to develop indices of political stability. We 
normalized these indicators on a scale from 0 to 10 in order to compare the data and then use 
them to produce an aggregate indicator. The aggregate index of Governance (GACP) will be 
the linear combination of PS governance indicators, COR, EG, RL, QR, VR: 
GACPi = y1PS +y2COR +y3EG +y4RL +y5QR +y6VR 
PS, CORE G RL VR and VR are the major components of the vectors and coefficients y1, y2, y3, 
y4, y5, y6 calculated by the series of data in each country. 
 
3.4. Regression results and interpretations 
Table 2: result of the estimation: the impact of governance on FDI from Asian countries 
(Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment, FDI) 
Variables 
explicative  
    M1     M2       M3      M4       M5   M6      M7 
     
 
      
STAB 
 
0.005*** 
0.000 
      
COR  0.059 
0.754 
     
EFF   0.191 
0.007 
    
Rule of law    0.008*** 
0.965 
   
REG     0.069* 
0.369 
  
RESP 
 
     0.039** 
0.682 
 
GOV 
 
      0.001*** 
0.833 
GDP 0.557 
0.761 
0.189 
0.036** 
0.442 
0.283 
0.415 
0.287 
0.352 
0.399 
0.612 
0.276 
0.640 
0.285 
HK 0.439* 
0.006 
0.779* 
0.061 
0.418 
0.118 
0.825 
0.027 
0.797 
0.014 
0.717 
0.047 
0.801 
0.023 
Openness 0.875 
0.936 
0.680 
0.165 
0.338 
0.046 
0.990 
0.414 
0.303 
0.257 
0.902 
0.385 
0.841 
0.383 
CRED 0.136 
0.855 
0.164 
0.537 
0.018** 
0.031 
0.145 
0.390 
0.095* 
0.167 
0.062* 
0.303 
0.156 
0.268 
INF 0.054 
0.033 
0.236 
0.068 
0.362 
0.208 
0.130 
0.136 
0.164 
0.183 
0.169 
0.115 
0.229 
0.145 
Debt 0.046*** 
0.000 
0.081*** 
0.002 
0.223 
0.005 
0.079* 
0.003 
0.249 
0.001 
0.071* 
0.002 
0.111 
0.002 
ODA 0.759 
0.470 
0.620 
0.459 
0.577 
0.470 
0.772 
0.372 
0.551 
0.366 
0.514 
0.367 
0.728 
0.374 
CL 0.163*** 
0.005 
0.546*** 
0.000 
0.554 
0.003 
0.218 
0.000 
0.927 
0.004 
0.219 
0.007 
0.102 
0.001 
 
Nombre 
d’obs. 
Nombre 
de groupes 
Wald 
Chi2(9) 
Probabilité 
 
 
 
118 
 
 7 
 
104.92 
0.7906 
 
118 
 
7 
 
91.47 
0.1279 
 
118 
 
7 
 
94.17 
0.0000 
 
118 
 
7 
 
33.54 
0.0001 
 
118 
 
7 
 
21.73 
0.0098 
 
118 
 
7 
 
24.69 
0.0033 
 
119 
 
17 
 
43.93 
0.0000 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
The interpretations of the results of the estimation for Asian countries 
Model M1 
For the results of the impact of governance on FDI from Asian countries, in the first model 
(M1), the probability of the test is greater than 5%, while the random effects model is prior to 
fixed effect model. In general, according to Table 1 in the notice that there are variables that 
are statistically significant and others is not significant and can be positively or negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable. 
Political stability variable is positive and statistically significant at 1%. This means that there is 
a positive relationship between political stability and FDI. These results confirm empirically 
studies by Asiedu (2003) show that the positive impact of political stability in the attraction of 
FDI. The high significance of political stability variable confirms our hypothesis that the 
influence of foreign direct investment stability. This result also confirms other recent 
estimates, including studies Gouenet (2011) examines the impact of socio-political instability 
on private investment in Cameroon. The socio-political instability is highlighted as a risk factor 
for investment that generates transaction costs for economic activity. 
The coefficient of human capital variable (KH), significant at the 10% level and negatively 
affects foreign direct investment. Inflation (INF), significant at the 5% threshold and positively 
correlated with FDI significant external debt at 1% level and negatively affects FDI. The 
significant civil liberty variable at the 1% threshold is positively contributes to the 
improvement of the ratio of inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asian countries over 
the period of the study. This result is comparable to others. Indeed, among the first 
researchers who are interested in studying the impact of institutions on economic 
performance of nations, and Körmendi Meguire (1985) examined the effect of civil liberties, 
among others, on economic growth and investment for 47 countries along only from 1950 to 
1977. 
The results they have achieved is that countries that have a high level of civil liberties are the 
best performers. Subsequent studies by SCULLY (1989) and Tullock (1987) found a positive 
association between civil liberties and economic growth for a large number of countries. 
Model M2 
Corruption is not significant, however, the distance of corruption "negative" suffered by the 
host country is associated with significantly lower levels of incoming FDI. GDP per capita 
significant at the 5% and positive. This result is consistent with previous studies (Hejazi, 2009, 
Medvedev, 2012), which confirmed that GDP attracts FDI. The significant human capital 
threshold of 10% and negatively affects FDI. The significant inflation at 5% threshold and 
positively affect FDI. The significant external debt at 1% level and negatively affects FDI. And 
civil liberty significant at the 1% threshold and positively affects foreign direct investment 
(FDI). 
Model M3 
Government effectiveness is not significant. The significant credit at the 5% threshold. 
Financial development increases foreign direct investment. Our results show that credit 
positively affect FDI. 
Model M4 
Rule of law significant at the 1% threshold and positively affect FDI. The significant external 
debt at 10% threshold is negatively correlated to FDI.  
Model M5 
Quality meaningful regulation at the 10% threshold and positively affects foreign direct 
investment. In a study by Ahn Chan-Lee (2002) on fifty five developed and developing 
countries, the two authors conclude that "improving regulatory systems functioning and 
governance and their implementation seem to be much larger than ordinary foundations of 
law in terms of impact on development» The significant variable credit at the 10% and 
positive. The significant variable credit at the 10% threshold. 
Model M6 
Track and significant responsibility at the 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. This result 
also confirms other recent estimates, Kim (2010) showed that there is a positive relationship 
between transparency in host countries and FDI inflows. These results are robust with market 
liberalization of stock and macroeconomic variables (GDP, exchange rate, corporate tax). The 
significant credit at the 10% and positively affect foreign direct investment. The significant 
external debt to 10% level and negatively affects FDI. 
Model M7 
The results showed that the coefficients of these governance variables, they are globally 
significant at the 1% and positively affect foreign direct investment (FDI). This means that 
governance positively and significantly contribute to improving the attractiveness of the Asian 
region. This could be explained among other things that the performance of Asian countries. 
This may reflect the government's ability to launch policies that favor foreign investors. The 
results confirm the study Globermen and Shapiro (2002) the link between governance and FDI 
flows and found that good governance yields are higher. This result reveals the relevance of 
governance and civil liberty as an explanation of the process of attraction of foreign investor 
countries in our sample. For example we found the same results the relationship between 
governance, civil liberty and economic growth as studies Tavares and Wacziarg (2001). Gani 
(2007) notes that the rule of law, control of corruption, regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness and political stability are positively correlated with FDI. 
 
 
Table 3: results of the estimation: the impact of governance on FDI for countries Arab 
Maghreb 
        (Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment, FDI) 
Variables 
explicative 
    M1      
 
    M2       M3      M4       M5   M6      M7 
STAB 0.878 
0.435 
      
COR  0.785 
0.814 
     
EFF   0.135 
0.855 
    
Rule of law    0.671 
0.983 
   
REG     0.502 
0.933 
  
RESP 
 
     0.050 
0.012** 
 
GOV 
 
      0.874 
0.897 
GDP 0.130 
0.269 
0.129 
0.273 
0.141 
0.335 
0.140 
0.307 
0.172 
0.322 
0.340 
0.593 
0.136 
0.308 
HK 0.266 
0.310 
0.254 
0.440 
0.478 
0.452 
0.180 
0.429 
0.173 
0.417 
0.641 
0.678 
0.238 
0.463 
Openness 0.001 
0.000*** 
0.001 
0.000**** 
0.000 
0.000*** 
0.001 
0.000*** 
0.001 
0.000*** 
0.003 
0.000*** 
0.001 
0.000*** 
CRED 0.256 
0.088 
0.203 
0.270 
0.155 
0.192 
0.112 
0.241 
0.142 
0.153 
0.341 
0.756 
0.139 
0.317 
INF 0.017 
0.033** 
0.017 
0.036** 
0.005 
0.026** 
0.014 
0.022** 
0.013 
0.025** 
0.014 
0.020** 
0.012 
0.025** 
Debt 0.057 
0.128 
0.058 
0.147 
0.077 
0.273 
0.052 
0.186 
0.073 
0.201 
0.137 
0.311 
0.012 
0.198 
ODA  0.164 
0.183 
0.175 
0.147 
0.243 
0.172 
0.169 
0.158 
0.251 
0.177 
0.320 
0.343 
0.174 
0.160 
CL 0.044 
0.091*  
0.044 
0.141 
0.014 
0.084* 
0.038 
0.081* 
0.052 
0.108* 
0.020 
0.009*** 
0.035 
0.085* 
Nombre 
d’obs. 
Nombre 
de groupes 
Wald 
Chi2(9) 
Probabilité 
 
 
 
85 
5 
 
3.43 
0.9448 
 
85 
5 
 
4.06 
0.9073 
 
85 
5 
 
6.38 
0.7010 
 
82 
5 
 
4.06 
0.9078 
 
80 
5 
 
4.21 
0.8971 
 
82 
5 
 
1.94 
0.9924 
 
80 
5 
 
3.82 
0.9232 
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1% 
 
The interpretations of the results of the estimation for the Arab Maghreb countries 
Model M1 
Political stability has no significant effect on foreign direct investment. The coefficient on trade 
openness is significant at the 1% so the results of the table suggests that trade openness is an 
important determinant of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the countries of the Arab 
Maghreb. They stress that a high level of openness increases the economic growth of the 
country and later foreign investors. Trade openness exerts a major effect on investment in 
these countries that the coefficient of this variable is always positive and statistically 
significant. 
The credit variable (CRED) significant at the 10% level and negatively affects foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The positive inflation and statistically significant at the 5% threshold. The 
significant civil freedom at the 10% threshold and negatively affects FDI. 
Model M2 
Variable of corruption is not significant, significant trade opening at the 1% level and positively 
affect FDI. The significant inflation at 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. 
Model M3 
Government effectiveness is not significant, the significant trade opening at the 1% level and 
positively affect FDI. The significant inflation at 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. And 
civil liberty significant at the 10% threshold and negatively affects foreign direct investment. 
Model M4 
Rule of law is not significant, the significant trade opening at the 1% level and positively affect 
FDI. The significant inflation at 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. The significant civil 
liberty to the 10% level and negatively correlated with FDI. 
Model M5 
Regulatory quality is not significant, significant trade opening at the 1%. The significant 
inflation at 5% level. 
Model M6 
Track and significant responsibility at the 5% threshold and negatively affects foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The significant trade opening at the 1% level and positively affect FDI. The 
significant inflation at 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. The significant civil liberty at 1% 
level and negatively affects FDI.  
Model M7  
Governance and does not significant, significant trade opening at the 1% level and positively 
affect FDI. The significant inflation at 5% threshold and positively affect FDI. The significant 
civil freedom at the 10% threshold and negatively affects foreign direct investment (FDI). 
We mean that governance could have a favorable impact on foreign direct investment in the 
country making more efforts for good governance as the Asian countries and the positive 
effect of civil society in the attractiveness of FDI. Political stability, the rule of law, regulatory 
quality and the way responsibility and also appear as governance factors that can influence 
more on foreign direct investment in Asia. As against the countries of the Arab Maghreb, civil 
society and the way responsibility and plays a negative role on FDI. By focusing our attention 
on the comparison between Asian countries and the countries of the Arab Maghreb on the 
attractiveness of FDI that was the center of interests of the study. Globerman and Shapiro 
(2002) found that the yields of good governance are more important 
 
Conclusion and policy implications 
This study aimed to analyze the relationship between governance and the flow of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the Arab Maghreb countries and Asian countries (ASEAN) for the 
period from 1996 to 2014. We reviewed the impact of governance through its various 
indicators (political stability, corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory 
quality and track and responsibility) in foreign direct investment. Empirical analyzes were 
conducted on panel data from seven Asian countries and five Arab Maghreb countries over 
de17 years. As part of this research, we have tried to contribute to the resolution of the 
fundamental question: is there extra link between governance and foreign direct investment 
(FDI)? To do this, we used a model of static panel data covering a sample of countries and Arab 
Maghreb countries in Asia, during the period 1996-2014. The study concluded that there is a 
positive relationship between FDI is governance and governance positively and significantly 
contributes to the improvement of the ratio of FDI inflow in Asian countries over the period 
of the study. As part of this empirical study we tested the relationship between governance 
indicators and FDI. The key findings emerged from this empirical analysis show: 
-a positive impact of political stability on foreign direct investment (FDI). 
-a positive effect of the rule of law on FDI. 
-a positive effect of regulation on quality FDI. 
-a positive impact of voice and accountability on FDI. In this paper we tried to examining the 
relationship between the quality of governance and foreign direct investment (FDI). We used 
a sample of countries of the Arab Maghreb and Asian countries during the period 1996-2014 
using the static method panels. The results indicate that during the period studied the 
relationship between governance and FDI. Similarly, the results show that the positive effect 
of governance in the attraction of FDI. The development of economies in transition compared 
to others. 
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